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Abstract 
 
The doctrine of Enlightened Shareholder Primacy 
(ESP) rejects the profit maximization focus in 
corporate governance. Its emergence helps 
company management to relate moral arguments 
associated with justice, fairness, and 
communitarianism with corporate self-regulation 
to reach an optimal welfare level. This article 
explicates the emergence of ESP and how it has 
contributed to the devolution into US corporate 
governance to create internal strategies focusing 
on pluralization of actors, ethics and 
accountability. 
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I.   Introduction 
Enlightened shareholder primacy (ESP) is a 
new approach in corporate governance (CG) 
framework. The emergence of this approach 
is important due to its role in answering a 
vital question: is the company really a 
private organization to be seen only through 
the economic prism of contract? Or is it 
public and about a wider group of interests 
and underwritten by communitarian concern 
about social responsibility? Apart from 
answering this question, ESP explains the 
changes in corporate directors’ roles and 
self-regulation strategies of companies.  
Recent literature has utilised the term 
ESP also as ‘enlightened shareholder value’ 
or ‘enlightened self-interest’ to indicate that 
although shareholder value is vital in 
corporate self-regulation, careful 
consideration of stakeholder interests is 
usually in the interest of the company.1 In 
these days shareholders are more interested 
to add other constituents’ concerns in 
corporate strategies. For instance, while 
earlier shareholders used to assign corporate 
directors only to look after the return of 
investment, nowadays they are allowing 
corporate directors to look beyond the set of 
contractual liabilities.2 I define this change 
in shareholders’ precepts as ‘enlightenment’ 
in their primacy within CG. With this 
change, company management gets better 
chance for assessing the impact of a 
particular decision considering the likely 
consequences for corporate reputation; 
company management are now more 
flexible to attract and retain employees and 
minimise transaction costs and risks by 
incorporating social policy goals at the 
centre of their strategies.3  
The impact of the emergence of ESP 
on CG and corporate self-regulation is 
noteworthy. This has brought the public 
policy issues that seek to protect investors as 
well as non-shareholding stakeholders at the 
fore of corporate strategies along with a 
                                                            
*LLB with Honours and LLM (Dhaka), LLM (Warwick), 
MPA (Singapore), PhD (Macquarie). Lecturer in Law, 
QUT Business School, Queensland University of 
Technology. Subject to the usual disclaimer, I would like to 
place on record my gratitude to Professor Larelle Chapple 
of the School of Accountancy, Queensland University of 
Technology, Associate Professor Shawkat Alam and Vijaya 
Nagarajan of Macquarie Law School of Macquarie 
University for their incisive comments on an earlier version 
of this article. I also want to express my gratitude to my 
colleagues for sharing their views related with the points I 
raised in this article. 
1Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services, Corporate Responsibility: Managing 
Risk and Creating Value (2006)46; see also UK Steering 
Group, Modern Company Law for A Competitive 
Environment: The Strategic Framework (1999)5, 41. 
2 Andrew Keay, ‘Tackling the Issues of the Corporate 
Objectives: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s 
Enlightened Shareholder Value Approaches’  26 (2007) 
Sydney Law Review 599 
3 UK Steering Group, Modern Company Law for A 
Competitive Environment: The Strategic Framework 
(1999)3.16-3.61. 
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functional economic focus. This has also 
contributed to the changes in the socio-legal 
view of corporate self-regulation of which 
one of the main objectives is to catalyse a 
process of deliberation that ensure that 
different actors can contribute to corporate 
governance and learn from the results of one 
another’s contributions. Another issue that 
has contributed to CG to gain attention as a 
public policy topic is the magnitude of the 
recent major corporate scandals. These 
incidents have prompted the legislators and 
businesses to allow greater scrutiny over ac-
counting manoeuvres and more transparency 
to prevent managers from engaging in fraud. 
4 In the USA, many corporate directors take 
their decisions based on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) along with the 
strategies for maintaining business case of 
their companies and they do not fear of 
being pursued by shareholders. This is 
consistent with the recent trend in 
relationship between the corporate 
governance and company management in 
this country; corporate managers of this 
country do not necessarily act for the 
interests of shareholders all the time.5  
However, the extent and the impact 
of the emergence of ESP in CG have not 
been clearly defined yet.6 For instance, in all 
                                                            
4 After the Enron crisis, the then US President  announced 
his Ten Point Plan to Improve Corporate Responsibility 
and Protect America’s Shareholders’ focusing on CG 
reform in the USA. Afterwards, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
was passed. This Act has introduced comprehensive 
accounting reform for public companies and severe 
penalties for failures to comply,
 
divided pro-business and 
pro-regulation advocates over the value of these re-
formative approaches and their political effects. For details 
see The President’s Leadership in Combating Corporate 
Fraud at <http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/corporatirresponsibility/> 
6 June 2011; Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act of 2002 at < http://www.j-
bradford-delong.net/movabletype/refs/2002 -07-25-
sarbanes.html> 6 June 2011; Harshbarger & Jois (2007). 
5 G Grave and P Swan, ‘The Economics of Corporate 
Governance: Beyond the Marshallian Firm’ (1994) Journal 
of Corporate Finance 139, 148. 
6 For details, check Neil Andrews, ‘Putting the Politics 
Back into Corporate Law: A Review of Stephen 
Bottomley’s The Constitutional Corporation: Rethinking 
Corporate Governance’ (2007) 21 Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law 161-172; James Mayanja, ‘The Proper 
the Issues of the Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law published in the last five 
years do not have any article related mostly 
with ESP. Some articles published in these 
Issues though touched some issues in ESP 
but none of them assessed the extent of the 
impact of ESP on corporate directors’ roles 
in CG. A limited number of studies 
published in some other journals have 
presented a basic descriptive claim that ESP 
is emerging as an increasingly relevant 
paradigm in CG scholarship, but a very few 
of them explore ESP as an alternate vision of 
corporate purpose; most of them do not 
focus on the nexus between ESP and 
managerial decision making within existing 
CG framework. None of them, however, 
have assessed the impact of ESP on 
corporate regulation and the changing roles 
of corporate directors in CG framework.7 
                                                                                         
Roles of Shareholders in Decision-making Processes of 
Modern Large Australian Public Companies’ (2009) 24 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 9-32; Angelo 
Veljanovski, Albie Brooks and Judy Oliver, ‘Independent 
Directors and Australia’s Corporate Governance Model: A 
Survey of Independent Director’s Views’ (2009) 24 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 33-54; Beth 
Nosworthy, ‘Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations: Is the 
Shareholder an Appropriate Beneficiary?’ (2010) 24 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 282-307; Nilubol 
Lertnuwat, ‘The Duties of Directors and Controlling 
Shareholders in Thai Listed Companies’ (2011) 26 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 165-199; John Purcell 
and Janice Loftus, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Expanding Directors’ Duties or Enhancing Corporate 
Disclosure’ (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
136-160; James Mayanja, ‘Promoting Enhanced 
Enforcement of Directors’ fiduciary Obligations: The 
Promise of Public Law  Sanction’ (2007) 20 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 157-182. In their empirical 
study, Alice et al. only assessed the changing roles and 
responsibilities of Australian boards and directors; they did 
not assessed the reasons behind this changing roles, let 
alone the impact of the rise of ESP on this change. For 
details, see Alice Klettner, Thomas Clarke and Michael 
Adams, ‘Corporate Governance Reform: An Empirical 
Study of the Changing Roles and Responsibilities of 
Australian Boards and Directors’ (2010) 24 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law  148-176. 
7 For another instance, this nexus is not at the core of the 
two recent and noteworthy studies in this area done by 
Professor Andrew Keay and Professor Virginia Harper. In 
his study, Andrew analyses the interface between the 
development of ESP and corporate response to this 
development in the UK. Harper explained the implication 
of ESP for dominant conceptions of the corporate purpose. 
For details see Keay, above n 2; Virginia Harper Ho, 
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This article endeavors to fill this gap. It 
explicates how corporate regulations hold 
ESP percepts, and insists companies mold 
their internal regulation so that corporate 
directors can include distributive aspects in 
efficiency models focused on maximizing 
shareholders’ profits.  
This article is structured as follows. 
In section two I define CG, which is 
essential given that ESP acts within CG 
framework. The third section assesses the 
contradictory arguments for and against the 
shareholder primacy in CG and the 
explanation for the emergence of ESP. The 
fourth section provides an explanation of the 
genesis of ESP and its impact on the recent 
development in corporate regulation of the 
USA. Finally it concludes that ESP 
gradually gained clear normative basis and 
its emergence has at least brought the need 
of corporate strategies that account actively 
for stakeholder interests; it joins with the 
arguments that corporate directors should 
have capacity to meet the objective of 
company owners and public policy goals. 
 
II.   Corporate Governance (CG) 
 
Before proceeding, a note on the meaning of 
‘corporate governance’ (CG) used in this 
paper is important. CG is an umbrella term.8 
                                                                                         
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value’: Corporate Governance 
Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide’ (2010). 
8 In the term CG, ‘governance’ comes from the Latin words 
gubernare and gubernator, which refer to steering a ship 
and the captain of a ship, respectively. This is the origin of 
the word governor. Another source of the word governance 
can be traced back to the old French word gouvernance 
meaning control and the state of being governed. Hence, the 
metaphoric meaning of this word is the idea of steering or 
captaining a ship, with the reference of control and good 
order. For details of ‘Corporate Governance’ see Andre 
Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate 
Governance’ (1997) 52(2) Journal of Finance 737; Shann 
Turnbull, ‘Corporate Governance: Its Scope, Concerns and 
Theories’ (1997) 5(4) Corporate Governance 180; Oliver 
Hart, ‘Corporate Governance: Some Theory and 
Implications’ (1995) 105(430) The Economic Journal 678; 
Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton and Alisa Röell, ‘Corporate 
Governance and Control’ (2003) 1 Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance 1; Catherine Daily, Dan Dalton and 
Albert Cannella Jr, ‘Corporate Governance: Decades of 
Dialogue and Data’ (2003) 28(3) Academy of Management 
Review 371; Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen 
In its narrow sense, it describes the formal 
system of accountability of corporate 
directors to the owners of companies. In its 
broad sense, the concept includes the entire 
network of formal and informal relationships 
involving the corporate sector and the 
consequences of these relationships to 
society in general.9 These two senses are not 
contradictory; but rather, complementary. 
CG has been described as the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to companies assure 
themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.10 However, it may also allude to 
‘the whole set of legal, cultural, and 
institutional arrangements that determine 
what publicly traded companies can do, who 
controls them, how that control is exercised, 
and how the risks and returns from the 
activities they undertake are allocated.’11 
Taking both these senses together, CG is no 
longer merely about maximizing the stock 
value. 
Within the CG framework in general, 
the roles, rights, and responsibilities of 
corporate directors are crucial.12 In 
particular, the board of directors is the most 
appropriate body to design policies and 
allow corporate management to fulfill its 
responsibilities to society.13 In most cases, 
this board is the sole body that 
communicates corporate performance to 
corporate owners. Moreover, with the 
                                                                                         
Ferrell, ‘What Matters in Corporate Governance?’ (2009) 
22(2) Review of Financial Studies 783. 
9 K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright, Corporate 
Governance: Economic and Financial Issues (1997)2. 
10 A ndrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, 'A survey of 
corporate governance' (1997) 52(2) Journal of finance 737. 
11 Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking 
Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century 
(1995)3. It would be worth mentioning here that CG is only 
partly ‘legal’ in the strictest sense and it takes into account 
varieties of non-legal and self-regulation practices. For 
details, see J Farrar, ‘In pursuit of an appropriate theoretical 
perspective and methodology for comparative corporate 
governance’ (2001) 13 Australian Journal of corporate 
Law 1. 
12 John Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles 
and Practice (2008) 69-146. 
13 Lawrence E Mitchell, ‘The Board as A Path toward 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Doreen Mcbarnet, 
Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (Eds), New 
Corporate Accountability (2007) 280. 
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beginning of the modern corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) era,14 its role in CG has 
extended enormously; Eisenberg describes 
this as the ‘board as manager’.15  
CG is instrumental in the attainment 
of fundamental social and economic goals. 
To reach these goals, numerous frameworks 
exist for CG, among which property 
justification for shareholder primacy is 
predominant; it challenges the inclusion of 
any strategy that undermines the profit-
centric notion of CG.  
 
III.    Enlightened Shareholder Primacy 
(ESP) 
 
The development of ESP dates back to the 
debate between Professor Adolf Berle and E 
Merrick Dodd concerning the objectives of a 
company. Berle argued that corporate 
directors should not, as managers of 
companies, have any responsibilities other 
than to shareholders and that their focus 
should be only upon making money.16 On 
                                                            
14 CSR is a fluid concept. In a broader sense, it is about the 
impact of business on a society or, in other words, the role 
of companies in the development of the society. In a 
narrower sense, it is a complex and multi-dimensional 
organisational phenomenon that may be defined as the 
extent to which, and the way in which, an organisation is 
consciously responsible for its actions (and non-actions) 
and the impact of these on its stakeholders. Regarding CSR 
definition, see generally M Van Marrewijk, ‘Concept and 
Definitions of CSR and Corporate Sustainability: Between 
Agency and Communion’ (2003) 44(2–3) Journal of 
Business Ethics 95,105; T Pinkston and Archie B Carroll, 
‘A Retrospective Examination of CSR Orientations: Have 
They Changed?’ (1996) 15(2) Journal of Business Ethics 
199, 207; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services, Corporate Responsibility: 
Managing Risk and Creating Value (2006) 4; for details, 
see Michale Blowfield and Jerdej George Frynas, ‘Setting 
New Agendas: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the Developing World’ (2005) 81(3) 
International Affairs 499, 501; Dirk Matten and Jeremy 
Moon, ‘“Implicit” and “Explicit” CSR: A Conceptual 
Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate 
Social Responsibility’ (2008) 33(2)  Academy of 
Management Review 404, 505.  
15 Aron Eisenberg, ‘The Modernisation of Corporate Law: 
An Essay for Bill Cary’ (1982) 37 University of Miami Law 
Review 187,209-10. 
16 Adolf A Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ 
(1930) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049. See also Adolf A 
Berle, ‘For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A 
Note’ (1931) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365; Adolf A Berle 
the other hand, Dodd argued that companies 
are economic institutions and that they 
should therefore have liabilities to contribute 
to social development along with the 
responsibility of generating profits for 
investments.17 While the arguments of Berle 
have largely been adopted, especially in the 
USA, the arguments of Dodd have 
successfully paved the way for a college of 
scholarship on the societal approach in CG. 
This seminal debate, and the practices 
following the proponents of this debate, has 
gradually raised the argument for corporate 
directors to consider the interests of their 
constituencies, other than their shareholders, 
in the actions they take.18 This has also 
created the scope for directors to design their 
strategies to reflect the public policy goals 
related to the long-term wellbeing of their 
company.  
Amongst the followers of this line of 
arguments, Germany and Japan are 
prominent for maintaining a scale of values 
based on different types of stakeholder needs 
and public policy goals in corporate 
strategies. In Germany, co-determination 
and worker representation on the 
supervisory boards of companies are 
common, while in the UK, CG allows 
corporate directors to consider employee 
issues that are beyond the contractual 
agreement. Recently, even a number of US 
States have created constituency statues that 
allow consideration of a broad range of 
                                                                                         
and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (1991). 
17 E Merrick Dodd, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?’ (1932) 45(7) Harvard Law Review 1145, 1148; 
see also E Merrick Dodd, ‘Is Effective Enforcement of the 
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?’ 
(1935)  University of Chicago Law Review 194. 
18 It would be worth mentioning a note of Jill Fisch here. 
While assessing the historical debate between Professor 
Berley and Dodd, he notes, ‘both Berle and Dodd 
distinguished the legal obligations of managers to 
shareholders from their obligations to other stakeholders 
but, at the same time, acknowledged the legitimacy of other 
stakeholder interests.’ For details, see Jill E Fisch, 
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy’ (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation 
Law  637,648. 
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stakeholders at the core of corporate 
strategies.19 
ESP moderates directors’ obligations 
to manage the company to ensure only short-
term benefits, such as maximising 
immediate profits.20 ESP suggests that 
corporate directors ought to be empowered 
to consider the interests of stakeholders 
while maintaining shareholder primacy. This 
has given new insights into how companies 
are run and operated on a daily basis within 
the precepts of CG.
 
It relates to the social 
welfare-driven approaches to CG and policy, 
and proposes that business efficiency should 
not only aim at higher stock prices but also 
at internalising environmental and social 
externalities and acknowledging the often 
unequal distributive consequences of 
creating corporate surpluses.21 However, the 
ESP concept does not undermine the 
interests of shareholders. Rather, it adds 
stakeholders’ interests to the CG framework 
along with shareholders’ interests. To avoid 
ambiguity, consider the following instance: 
where there are two decisions a company 
can take, X and Y, where both benefit the 
company equally but where X may benefit 
one or more constituency interests and Y 
may not, then according to this concept, X 
could be adopted. Corporate management 
should not take a course of action that 
clearly provides benefits to a number of 
constituencies but does not provide any 
                                                            
19 John Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles 
and Practice (2008)451. In this regard, in many 
jurisdictions, courts have stated that CG can make 
commercial judgments based on the interest of non-
shareholder interest in the management of the company. For 
some instances of court decisions, see Provident 
International Company V International Leasing Corp Ltd 
[1969] 1 NSWR 424, 440; Paramount Communications Inc 
V Time Inc 571 A. 2d 1140 (Del, 1989). 
20 Corporations and Market Advisory Committee, ‘Social 
Responsibility of Corporations’ (CMAC, 2006)84-89. 
Available at <http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac. 
nsf/byheadline/pdffinal+reports+2006/$file/csr_report.pdf>  
at 8 June 2011. 
21 Kent Greenfield, ‘New Principles for Corporate Law’ 
(2005) 1 Hastings Business Law Journal 87; Lawrence 
Mitchell, ‘Theoretical and Practical Framework for 
Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes’ (1991) 70 
Texas Law Review 579. 
benefits to shareholders. Thus, this concept 
emphasises moral arguments associated with 
justice, fairness, and communitarianism22 
and endorses doctrinal approaches that reject 
the exclusivity of cost-benefit analysis and 
the exclusion of distributive aspects from 
efficiency models focused on maximising 
each transaction’s dollar value.23 Given this, 
the central precepts of ESP are:  
 
 
(1) an explicit focus of shareholders on 
long-term goal of their investment, and  
(2) an implied consent of shareholders 
to corporate directors and managers for 
considering the effects of their decisions 
related with extended stakeholder 
constituencies and broader public policy 
goals.  
 
ESP asserts that shareholder should 
not achieve wealth through disregarding the 
necessity for corporate decision making on 
stakeholder interests. It also argues for a 
shareholder democracy debate in CG by 
advocating ‘an enlightened shareholder 
value vision of the corporate purpose that 
transcends the shareholder-stakeholder 
divide.’24 Although there could be reasons to 
doubt that these arguments are well enough 
to prompt an immediate regulatory reform in 
all major jurisdictions, these arguments 
indicate that the position of shareholders in 
CG and the conception of corporate purpose 
are changing. The impact of the rise of 
institutional investors as shareholders or 
lenders of companies plays a vital role in 
                                                            
22 Kent Greenfield, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: 
There’s A Forest in Those Trees: Teaching About 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2000) 34 Georgia Law 
Review. 1011; Ronen Shamir, ‘The Age of 
Responsibilisation: On Market-Embedded Morality’ (2008) 
37(1) Economy and Society 1. 
23 For a recent critique of the existing scholarship of 
corporate regulation thought, see generally Kent 
Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental 
Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (2006). 
24Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value’: 
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-
Stakeholder Divide’ (2010) 62, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/virginia_ho/2 
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this change.25 Amongst the institutional 
investors, public and union pension funds 
are at the forefront to add environmental, 
social and ethical measures with the core 
corporate strategies and portfolio risk 
analysis. These financial institutions and 
funds account for a significant percentage of 
world equity holdings and hence their 
activism usually impact over the aims of 
shareholders of a large number of companies 
heavily depended on external funds.26 This 
activism is one of the reasons that ultimately 
helps the shareholders to enlighten their 
aims and allows corporate directors and 
managers to balance shareholders pressure 
for long term profits and the need for 
companies to relate socio-environmental 
issues with company strategies. In their 
study, Gilmour and Caplans found this trend 
and mentioned that:   
 
The global investor community has begun 
to develop a consensus view of the 
behaviour companies are expected to 
exhibit, and the kind of information they 
should report. [...] Analysts and investors 
are now asking about sustainability-related 
performance issues alongside financial 
measures. BP and Coca-Cola are two 
examples of large companies that faced 
questions on environmental and social 
issues at their recent annual general 
meetings. BP was asked about adapting to 
                                                            
25 Ibid. For an idea regarding this rise, the funds invested in 
"responsible investments" in January 2006 amounted to 
more than 1,313 billion euro; in UK alone, such investment 
was more than 800 billion euro. For details, see Ethical 
Investment Research Services Ethical Investment Research 
Services, ‘The State of Responsible Business: Global 
Corporate Response to Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) Challenges’ (2007) EIRiS Ltd, London. 
p 20. 
26 Over the past decade, for an instance, the percentage of 
the total US equity markets held by pension funds have 
averaged closer to 25 per cent compared to an average of 20 
per cent for mutual funds. As of 2008, public pension 
funds, such as CalPERS, which invest for the benefit of 
state and local public employees, accounted for roughly 
6per cent of the total equity market in the USA. This figure 
represents less than half of the aggregate equity holdings by 
mutual funds, which in 2008 stood at 15.3 per cent of all 
equities in this country. For details, see Matteo Tonello and 
Stephen Rabimov, ‘The Conference Board 2009: 
Institutional Investment Report’ (2009). 
climate change, and Coca-Cola about the 
extent to which its bottles and cans could be 
recycled.27  
 
Some international instruments, for 
instance, the United Nations Principles for 
Reasonable Investment, join with this role of 
institutional investors and urge for more 
analysis on the changes into shareholder 
primacy in CG as part of company and 
portfolio-level risk management. The core of 
such call is that the rights of a person or a 
group from an acceptable proposition are 
enforceable and CG is also subject to ideas 
on ethics, social justice, and moral sense.28 
These principles were developed by the joint 
efforts of 20 leading investors who are 
committed to incorporate social and 
environmental issues in CG.29 From the 
country perspective, Germany and Japan are 
prominent for maintaining a scale of values 
                                                            
27 Gilmour, G. and Caplan, A, ‘Who cares?’  (2001) 
Accountancy 128 (1297) 44-5. 
28 John Plender, A Stake in the Future: The Stakeholding 
Solution (1997) in Janice Dean, Directing Public 
Companies: Company Law and the Stakeholder Society 
(2001)117. 
29 The PRI initiative is governed by an elected Board of 11 
representatives from asset owner signatory organizations 
and two representatives from the United Nations. The 
Secretariat reports to the PRI Board. By the end of 2010, 
the assets under PRI management was worth $20 trillion. 
For details, see The Principles for Responsible Investment 
Initiative at http://www.unpri.org /about/ (last visited July 
21, 2010); Principles for Responsible Invest. Initiative, 
Annual Report of the PRI Initiative 2009, 6 (2009) at 
http://www.unpri.org/ 
files/PRI%20Annual%20Report%2009.pdf; Signatories to 
the Principle for Responsible Investment at 
http://www.unpri.org/signatories/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2010); 
As of the start of 2010, 12.2 per cent of all professionally 
managed assets in the U.S., then valued at $3.07 trillion, 
were engaged in some form of ‘socially responsible 
investment’ (SRI) oriented investing, according to the 
Social Investment Forum, the U.S. trade association for SRI 
investment and research. Social Investment Forum 
Foundation, 2010 Report on Socially Responsible Investing 
Trends in the United States, available at 
http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/pubs/. These figures 
include over 490 mutual fund products in the United 
States—with assets totalling $569 billion. See also Risk 
Metrics GRP., 2008 ESG Background Report: 
Sustainability Reporting, 13–14 (May 2008), available at 
http://www.riskmetrics.com/system /files/private/2008_ 
ESG_Sustainability_Report.pdf. This report mentions that 
this represents a growth in SRI assets of over 18%, 
compared to 3% for non-SRI managed assets). 
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based on different types of moral sense and 
ethics in CG. In Germany, co-determination 
and worker representation on the 
supervisory boards of companies are 
common, while in the UK, CG allows 
corporate directors to consider employee 
issues that are beyond the contractual 
agreement. Recently, even a number of US 
states have created constituency statutes that 
allow consideration of a broad range of 
stakeholders.30  
ESP has shifted the underlying 
objective of shareholder primacy in CG. 
While the goal of shareholder primacy was 
to channel corporate management for 
maximizing profit out of their investment, 
ESP has emphasized that along with the goal 
of profit generation, internal regulation of 
companies should be responsive to the goals 
of a society in which a company operates.31 
It highlights that corporate self-regulation is 
not just a mechanism for maximizing values 
–of profits or of reputation; this regulation 
should also be concerned to do what is right, 
to be faithful to its identity in society as a 
law abiding entity, and to sustain an 
effective mechanism for fulfilling its 
responsibilities to its stakeholders.  
 
 
 
                                                            
30 John Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles 
and Practice (2008) 451; Cynthia A. Williams and John M. 
Conley, ‘An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the 
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct’ (2005) 38 
Cornel International Law Journal 493, 515–17. 
31 It would be worth mentioning the observation of this 
perspective by the Canadian Democracy and Corporate 
Accountability Commission. This Commission considered 
that the activities for fulfilling corporate social 
responsibilities ‘somewhere between the proponents of 
shareholder primacy and its most severe critics.’ This 
Commission does not reject the need of companies to earn a 
modest return of shareholders’ investments; it suggests that 
profit making should be placed ‘within a more 
comprehensive, democratic accountability framework’. 
Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability 
Commission, The New Balance Sheet: Corporate Profits 
and Responsibilities in the 21st Century (2002)3; For a 
discussion on how social responsibility issues get into the 
companies, see Paula Darvas, ‘Grounding the ‘social 
responsibility’ of companies in the language of human 
rights: A survey of the issues’ (2007) 20 Australian Journal 
of Corporate Law 129, 145. 
IV.   Impact of ESP on corporate self-
regulation  
 
ESP permits corporate directors to focus on 
long-term interests. It is accepted that most 
shareholders prefer to earn a stable rate of 
profit over the long term; not all 
shareholders want the directors to focus on 
short-term benefits.32 The Australian 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Companies and Financial Services is of the 
view that these days most shareholders 
prefer to support corporate responsibility, as 
they believe that this will lead to long-term 
gain for them.33 ESP allows corporate 
directors to decide on corporate issues based 
on their own conscience and economic 
justification; it allows directors to balance 
the interests of a wide range of constituents. 
According to this approach, ‘directors 
merely have to state that what they did was a 
result of balancing interests, and no one 
could challenge the conclusion at which they 
arrived.’34 This has assisted different 
economies to add provisions related to social 
issues in corporate laws. For instance, the 
operational and financial review completed 
in the UK was built on ESP notions, that is, 
it was designed to provide corporate 
directors with better scope to relate non 
shareholder constituency concerns in 
corporate strategies. The EU adopted this 
approach in its modernisation directive that 
requires a balanced review of a company’s 
                                                            
32 International Accounting Standards Board, ‘Discussion 
Paper on Priliminary Views on an Improved Conceptual 
Framewok for Financial Reporting: The Objective of 
Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of 
Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information’ (2006) in 
Investment Management Association, ‘IMA Response to 
Discussion Paper on An Improved Conceptual Framework 
for Financial Reporting’ (2006)4. 
33 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services, above n 253, 50; At this point, 
Hansmann and Kraakman mention that there is ‘no longer 
any serious competitor to the view that corporate law 
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder 
value.’ For details, see Hansmann and Kraakman, above n 
203; see also Michael Jensen, ‘Value Maximisation, 
Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function’ 
(2001) 7(3) European Financial Management 297. 
34 Keay, above n 2,602. 
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non-financial key performance indicators, 
including information relating to 
environmental and employee matters. The 
European Management Audit Scheme and 
the Companies Act 2006 of the UK are some 
instances where considerable weight has 
been given to this approach.35 The following 
section discusses the impact of ESP over the 
recent changes in the corporate regulation 
framework in the USA. 
It would be worth providing a short 
note on regulation as its definition is unclear, 
but covers very broad areas of state control 
over social and economic activities, 
including various forms of unintentional and 
non-state actions.36 Nonetheless, it is widely 
accepted that regulation refers to anything 
that controls or influences the activities in 
which society is an important aspect.37  Such 
control or influence is purported to prevent 
undesirable behaviour, actions and activities, 
and to enable and encourage desirable 
ones.38 To this end, regulations may include 
                                                            
35 For details, see Filip Gregor, ‘How Can Reporting 
Become A Relevant tool for Corporate Accountability at 
the European Level?’ (2007) Discussion Paper for 
European Coalition for Corporate Justice 
<http://ec.europa.eu/company/policies/sustainable-
business/corporate-social-responsibility/reporting-
disclosure/swedish-
presidency/files/position_papers/how_can_reporting_beco
me_a_relevant_ tool_ en.pdf> at 14 July 2011. 
36 Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood, A 
Reader on Regulation (1998)4; for a detailed study on 
regulation, see generally Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections 
on Regulation’ (2002) 27(1) Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy; Christine Parker, ‘The Pluralisation of 
Regulation’ (2008) 9 Theoretical Inquiries in Law. 
37 P Selznick, Focusing Organisational Research on 
Regulation, Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 
(1985); Keith Hawkins and Bridget Hutter divide the 
landscape of regulation into two major parts: The economic 
regulation and social regulation. They define economic 
regulation as regulation of financial markets, price and 
profits, and the social regulation as laws protecting the 
environment, consumer, social values, employees. For 
details, see Keith Hawkins and Bridget M Hutter, ‘The 
Response of Business to Social Regulation in England and 
Wales: An Enforcement Perspective’ (1993) 15(3) Law & 
Policy 199; Bridget M Hutter, Compliance: Regulation and 
Environment (1997)7. 
38 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave consider regulation as a 
tool of the government to intervene in the economy and in 
the rules of private ordering systems to influence the 
behaviour of business. For details, see Robert Baldwin and 
Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy 
policies, norms, market principles, laws, 
institutional and international principles, or 
covenants designed to affect social and 
economic behaviour and activities.39  
Accordingly, all law is regulatory in 
nature.40  
The aim of regulation varies with the 
objectives of regulators in different contexts. 
One of the predominant aims of creating 
regulation is to render the behaviour of 
regulatees consistent with market principles 
and widely-valued social norms by 
emphasising greater efficiency and 
flexibility in internal management. 
Accordingly, in the corporate regulation 
landscape, the manner in which CG could 
improve compliance at the generic level 
without being intrusive in usual business 
practice is an ever-growing issue.41  
The roles, rights and liabilities of 
corporate directors in corporate regulation 
are important issues in regard to controlling 
the internal regulation of companies in the 
USA. Corporate regulations of this country 
are in fact predominantly director-centric 
and ‘seems to have ragingly endorsed a 
managerialist or entity orientation, rather 
than shareholder-centric control rules.’42 For 
instance, the Model Business Corporation 
Act and the Corporate Code of Delaware 
                                                                                         
and Practice (1999)2, 63; Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and Pacific, ‘The Economic 
Regulation of Transport Infrastructure Facilities and 
Services Principles and issues’ (United Nations, 2001)1. 
39 Anthony I Ogus sees regulation as ‘fundamentally a 
politico-economic concept and, as such, can best be 
understood by reference to different systems of economic 
organisation and the legal forms which maintain them.’ for 
details, see Anthony I Ogus, Regulation: Legal form and 
Economic Theory (1994)1; Peter C Yeager, The Limits of 
Law: The Public Regulation of Private Pollution (1993)24. 
40 Archana Parashar, ‘Re-conceptualising Regulation, 
Responsibility and Law’ (2008) 8 Macquarie Law Journal 
59. 
41 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding 
Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, 
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate (1995); A. Shleifer, ‘Understanding Regulation’ 
(2005) 11(4) European Financial Management 439. 
42 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the 
Business Corporation, (1992)14 Cardozo Law Review 261, 
279.  
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confer upon the board of directors the 
authority and responsibility to manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation.43 
This has been made possible for the recent 
trends expanding shareholders’ interests for 
long-term return of their investments and 
reputation. With this development, CG of 
this country appears to be moving toward a 
model of corporate control where influence 
over corporate decision-making is shared by 
shareholders and corporate boards.  
Legal regulation for corporate 
activities in this country holds the 
underlying notion of ESP precepts and thus 
expressly permits corporate directors and 
senior official to incorporate stakeholder 
preference along with the interests of 
shareholders. The majority of states of this 
country reformed their corporate laws and 
adopted constituency concerns, which allow 
directors to consider the impact of corporate 
decisions on a broad range of stakeholders, 
not just on shareholders, and permit 
decisions in the best interests of the 
corporation even if they are not justified on 
the basis of shareholders’ economic 
interests.44 Most of these states’ laws 
                                                            
43 Section 8.01(b) of the Model Business Corporation Act  
(4th ed. 2008) is as follows: ‘All corporate powers shall be 
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors 
of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the 
corporation shall be managed under the direction, and 
subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . ..’ See 
also, Section 141(a) of Delaware Code Annotation 2009: 
‘the business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . 
..’ Mention of a note of Lynn Stout would also be 
appropriate here; he points out that the default rules giving 
greater discretion to directors also appear to be the initial 
rules preferred by investors themselves at the IPO stage. 
For details, see Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on 
―Shareholder Primacy (unpublished manuscript, available 
at < http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollection 
Documents/uclasloan%20foundation%20conference/new%
20thinking %20on%20shareholder%20primacy.pdf>). 
44 See also, Indiana Code, No. 23-1-35-1 (2010). These 
statutes were adopted in response to the hostile takeover 
wave of the 1980s and early 1990s. In practice, courts have 
relied on them only rarely since the business judgment rule 
and other anti-takeover statutes already protect directors 
who reject takeover bids out of concern for other 
stakeholders. Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency 
Statutes and Employee Governance (2004)30 William 
Mitchell Law Review 1227, 1231–32. 
uniformly authorize corporate directors to 
make charitable contributions even without 
showing any reason that the contribution 
will improve company profitability.45 
Accordingly, in most of the states of this 
country, courts usually do not second-guess 
directors’ ‘business judgment’ that is based 
on concerns about employees, communities, 
and other non-shareholder constituencies, as 
long as they have clearly breached the core 
conditions of their fiduciary duty.46 
 Amongst the recent development in 
corporate regulation related to corporate 
governance, the Consumer Protection Act 
2010, the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX), 
the Shareholder Bill of Rights Act 2009 and 
the legislations on ‘benefit corporations’ are 
noteworthy. These laws holds the core of 
ESP; they aim to ‘promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, to end ‘‘too big to fail’’, to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.’47  
 The SOX emphasizes the need for a 
code of business for all corporations. Section 
406 of this Act requires that directors of a 
corporation are liable for disclosing the 
existence of a code of business ethics or 
explain the reasons for not adopting such a 
code. In Section 1502, this legislation also 
emphasizes on the corporate directors 
                                                            
45 See also, Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 63 (Del. 1961). 
In this litigation, the court defines Section 122(9) of the 
Delaware Code and opined that the charitable contributions 
of Delaware corporate authority should be limited only by a 
reasonableness test. 
46 The exercise of discretion by corporate management is 
further shielded by standard charter provisions that 
exculpate or indemnify directors and officers for breach of 
the duty of care. See generally, D. Gordon Smith, ‘The 
Shareholder Primacy Norm’ (1998) 23 Journal of 
Corporate Law 277 (arguing that because of the expansive 
scope of the business judgment rule, the true role of 
shareholder primacy in corporate law has been highly over-
rated). 
47 Preamble of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act 2010. This Act is available at < 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents
/file/hr4173_enrolledbill.pdf> 17 June 2012. 
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responsibility for the advancement of 
corporate responsibilities to the non-
shareholder stakeholders. Similarly the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ listing rules 
require the directors promote honest and 
ethical conduct in the face of conflicts of 
interest and ensure compliance with other 
laws.  
The Shareholder Bill of Rights Act 
2009 requires the SEC ensure through the 
national securities exchanges and national 
securities associations that the listing of any 
security of an issuer must in compliance 
with the regulations for director 
independence, mandatory annual elections 
of the directors and compulsory 
establishment of risk committee. This 
development in corporate related regulation 
has a huge impact over the directors’ 
commitments for ensuring a more focused 
societal approach in the corporate self-
regulation.  
 The growing number of legislations 
on benefit corporations is another vital 
instance of the impact of ESP on recent 
development of corporate regulation in the 
USA. A ‘benefit corporation’ or ‘B Corp’ is 
the recent form of corporations in the world. 
This form of corporation is designed to earn 
profit as well as to consider the societal and 
environmental issues at the core of corporate 
self-regulation.48 The main difference 
between a traditional corporation and a 
benefit corporation lies in the purpose of 
these corporations. While the purpose of a 
traditional corporation is to maximize the 
return of the shareholder investments, the 
benefit corporation creates general public 
benefit in addition to creating profit for the 
shareholders.49 They are also different in 
                                                            
48 Chrystia Freeland, 'Capitalism, but with a little heart', The 
New York Times (New York), 2013 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/19iht-
letter19.html?_r=0>  
49 'Firms with benifits: A new sort of caring, sharing 
company gathers momentum', The Economist (New York), 
2012 <http://www.economist.com/node/21542432>  Mark 
A Underberg, Benifit corporations vs 'Regular' 
Corporations: A Harmful Dichotonomy (2012) Harvard 
Law School  Gar Alperovitz, 'The New-Economy 
terms of their internal administration for 
accountability and transparency.    
Starting from Maryland in April 
2010, there are more than 15 US states that 
has passed legislations on benefit 
corporations.50 The enacting state’s benefit 
corporation legislations are added with the 
existing corporation’s codes with a set of 
common purposes. These purposes are: (a) 
creating general public benefit; (b) 
exercising the right to name specific public 
benefit purposes; and (c) considering the 
interest of the non-shareholder stakeholders 
along with the interest of the shareholders.51 
All most all of the legislations on 
benefit corporations in the USA require the 
directors and officers include the creation of 
public benefit and the consideration of non-
financial interests in their list of fiduciary 
duties. Hence, the corporate managements of 
the benefit corporation in the USA gets legal 
protection to consider the interests of the 
employees, the community, and the 
environment when making decisions, even 
in liquidation and sale situations. Indeed, 
these legislations provide a platform to the 
potential shareholders of corporations who 
wish to raise their investment return but do 
not want to loose the control of the social 
and environmental mission of their 
investments.  
The corporate regulation framework 
along with the profit centric CG framework 
of this country is changing. The emergence 
of ESP has played a strong role behind this 
change. The recent changes in the corporate 
regulation of Delaware would be an 
appropriate instance here.52 The focus of the 
                                                                                         
Movement' (2014)   
<http://neweconomy.net/publications/new-economy-
movement> 
50 B Lab, 'Maryland first state in Union to pass benifit 
corporation legislation' (2010)  CSR Press Release  
<http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-
First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-
Legislation> 
51Benefit Corp, What is benefit corporation (2014)  
<http://benefitcorp.net/quick-faqs>       
52 Foley Hoag, Delaware enacts benifit corporation 
legislation (2013) Foley Hoag LLP 
<http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-
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corporate code of this state which was less 
receptive to stakeholder interests than many 
other state corporate statutes has been 
changed. This code in these days does not 
require management decision-making only 
to maximize shareholder wealth or even be 
justified solely in terms of shareholder 
interests.53 ESP legitimizes the far-sighted 
strategies in corporate regulation of this 
state. It drives this code to support corporate 
directors’ and senior managers’ initiatives 
by considering the interests of non-
shareholder constituents as long as these 
initiatives foster corporate profits.  
 Since the focus for incorporation of 
constituency concerns in companies in the 
USA is driven by a context in which 
minimal legislative control on business is 
preferable, this country emphasises 
developing specialised organisations to 
assist directors and senior officials of 
companies to incorporate social, 
environmental and ethical principles into 
their business strategies.54 For instance, the 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Consumer 
Product Safety Commission and the 
Environmental Protection Agency55 are 
dedicated to maintaining standards for 
responsible corporate business practices that 
establish thresholds for CSR behaviour in 
                                                                                         
updates/2013/july/delaware-enacts-benefit-corporation-
legislation> Jack Markell, 'A new kind of corporation to 
harness the power of private enterprise for public benefit', 
huff Post Business 2013 <Harvard Law School forum on 
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation> 
53 Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value’: 
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-
Stakeholder Divide’ (2010); for details, see Jill E. Fisch, 
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy, (2006) 31 Journal of Corporate Law  
637, 652. 
54 For a general idea on how the USA uses legislation 
compared to the EU, see Joan C Williams, The interaction 
of Courts and Legislatures in Creating Family-Responsive 
Workplaces, Working Time for Working Families: Europe 
and the United States (2005). 
55 Roberto Gutierrez and Audra Jones, ‘Effects of Corporate 
Social Responsibility in Latin American Communities: a 
Comparison of Experiences’ (2004) available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1018680> at 27 March 2011. 
daily business operations. The better known 
contributions of this process are the 
development of industry-specific and sector-
wise regulation, such as in pollution control, 
working conditions, and consumer 
protection.56 The US Model Business 
Principles is a voluntary guideline for 
companies, and the aim of this instrument is 
to assist corporate directors for developing 
self-regulated responsibility at the company 
level. It is based on the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning 
multinational companies and social policy 
and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.57 Corporate societies have 
begun incorporating these principles into 
their self-regulatory mechanisms. For 
instance, the USA automobile makers 
require their suppliers to adopt 
environmental management systems as a 
requirement for doing business.58 Similarly, 
the American Forest and Paper Association 
requires its members to adopt a set of 
management practices directed toward 
sustainable forestry.59 Other important 
                                                            
56 For instance, some of these legislations are the 
Community Reinvestment Act 1977 (USA), the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act 1948 (USA), the Clean Air Act 
(Amendments) 1977 (USA), the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act 1970 (USA), the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act 1972 (USA), the Consumer Product Safety  
Act 1972 (USA), the foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 
(USA) and the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act 200 (USA). 
57 See United States Department of Commerce, US Model 
Business Principles (1995) <www.state.gov/www/ 
global/human_rights/business_principles.html> at 28 
March 2011. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises recommends the principles a country should 
incorporate into their laws and policies to encourage their 
companies to observe responsible business conducts. The 
Guidelines were updated in 2011 for the fifth time since 
they were first adopted in 1976. For details of this update, 
visit < http://www.oecd.org/document/ 18/0,3343, 
en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.html > at 22 June 
2012. 
58 Press Release, Ford Motor Company, ‘Ford Becomes 
First U.S. Automaker to Require Suppliers to Achieve ISO 
14001 Certification’ (Sep. 21, 1999); Press Release, 
General Motors Corporations, ‘General Motors Sets New 
Level of Environmental Performance for Suppliers’ (Sep. 
21, 1999). 
59 Errol Meidinger, ‘The New Environmental Law: forest 
Certification’ (2003) 10 Buffalo Environmental Law 
Journal 211, 239; Jennifer Nash, Industry Codes of 
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organisations working for the development 
of the incorporation of the ethos of public 
policy goals in the self-regulated corporate 
responsibility system are the Center for 
Corporate Ethics, a division of the Institute 
for Global Ethics, and the Fair Labor 
Association. The US Securities and 
Exchange Commission has recently stated 
that its goal is to change corporate behavior 
so that the aim of internal regulation of 
companies is more aligned to public policy 
goals; it has started experimenting this 
change in corporate self-regulation with the 
practice of reform undertakings.60 
Some federal activities of this 
country indirectly insist that corporate 
management incorporate social and 
environmental issues into their self-
regulatory mechanisms. For instance, 
through the Department of State’s Award for 
Corporate Excellence, the government 
endorses ESP values by providing awards to 
companies, and a Department of Commerce 
program facilitates CG by providing training 
to corporate directors on corporate 
stewardship.61 Some organs of the 
government provide partnership with 
corporations on specific projects related to 
their core mission.62 These programs 
indirectly help endorse, facilitate, partner, or 
mandate the core principles of CSR in the 
USA business’s global corporate 
responsibility efforts. Another important 
USA initiative to make corporate directors 
                                                                                         
Practice: Emergence and Evolution, New Tools for 
Environmental Protection: Education, Information and 
Voluntary Measures (2002) 237. 
60 For details, see C Ford, ‘Toward a New Model for 
Securities Law’ (2005) 57 Administrative Law Review 757, 
797-806. 
61 United States Government Accountability office (Report 
to Congressional requesters), Numerous Federal Activities 
Complement U.S. Business’s Global Corporate Social 
Responsibility Efforts (2005) <www.gao.gov/ 
fraudnet/fraudnet.htm> at 24 April 2008. 
62 For example, the US Agency for International 
Development provided a partnership with one USA 
Company working in post-war Angola to reconstruct the 
country’s business sector and workforce. Other agencies, 
such as the Overseas Private investment Corporation, 
mandate CSR by requiring companies to fulfil CSR-related 
objectives to obtain their services. 
effectively work for developing social 
responsibility performance of companies is 
the advancing notion of social responsibility 
in large investments.63 
The emergence of ESP has helped 
corporate directors to develop different self-
regulatory strategies to target company 
resources in a more sophisticated manner 
and direct corporate management to hold 
public policy goals as central in corporate 
self-regulation of the USA.64 This 
development in CG has begun the process of 
convergence in the tensions between CG’s 
engagement with shareholder and 
stakeholder interests. It offers philosophical 
insights as to why companies should not be 
treated solely as their shareholders’ private 
property but rather as semi-public 
companies based on sophisticated 
transactions and relational contracts among 
investors, managers, employees and other 
stakeholders.65 It suggests that applying the 
contractarian approach to corporate law 
(which portrays the company as a voluntary 
‘nexus of contracts’)66
 
as well as the realistic 
approach (which paints the company as a 
separate legal personality akin to a human 
being)67 should not result in giving superior 
                                                            
63 Ibid; the amount of investment increased greatly in the 
1980s to African Black people as millions of people, 
churches, universities, cities and states used this investment 
strategy to press the White government of South Africa to 
abstain from the racist apartheid system. Socially 
responsible investment was involved in the wake of the 
Bhopal, Chernobyl and Exxon Valdez incidents, and is 
currently involved in efforts to combat global warming and 
ozone depletion. By and large, environmental issues have 
come to the forefront of companies’ socially responsible 
investment agendas. 
64 Orly Lobel and O Amir, 'Behavioral versus Institutional 
Antecedents of Decentralized Enforcement in 
Organizations: An Experimental Approach' (2007)  
Regulation . 
65 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, ‘A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85(2) Vanderbilt Law 
Review 247. 
66 Michael Klausner, ‘The Contractarian theory of 
Corporate Law: A Generation Later’ (2005) 31 Journal of 
Corporation Law 779,782-784; Melvin Eisenberg, ‘The 
Conception that the Corporation is A Nexus of Contracts, 
and the Dual Nature of the Firm’ (1998) 24 Journal of 
Corporation Law 819,825-826. 
67 David S. Allen, ‘The First Amendment and the Doctrine 
of Corporate Personhood’ (2001) 2 (3) Journalism 255. 
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property rights to shareholders over 
employees. Rather, they posit, workers who 
invest their labour as an input in the 
company should enjoy legal recognition of 
their residual interest in the company’s 
assets.68  
Whereas previously there were two 
separate mechanisms of CG — one catering 
to ‘profit centric’ corporate decision-making 
and the other to ‘socially responsible’, 
people-friendly business strategies — ESP 
precepts has contributed to development of 
more hybridised, synthesised body of 
governance and norms that regulate 
corporate practices. It promotes corporate 
self-regulation structures that require 
companies to track the growing public 
expectations for accountability. Studies 
show that internal governance policies that 
emphasise social responsibility through 
transparency and coordination are more 
successful in bringing about ethical 
corporate conduct than traditional 
perspective of corporate self-regulation.69 
The proponents of ESP believe that this self-
regulation structure can and should be 
designed to rely less on shareholder dictated 
preferences and more on shareholder-
stakeholder collaboration, flexibility, and 
pragmatism.70 With the impact of these 
proponents in corporate regulation 
scholarship, corporate directors in the USA 
are more willing to consider effective ways 
of enforcing compliance standards and 
processes, as well as share more 
information, when they operate in a 
collaborative climate that allows them to 
                                                            
68 Kent Greenfield, ‘The Place of Workers in Corporate 
Law’ (1997) 39 Boston College Law Review 283; William 
Allen, ‘Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business 
Corporation’ (1992) 14 Cardozo Law Review 261. 
69 Phlip Selznick, The Communitarian Persuasion 
(2002)101; see generally, John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame, 
and Reintegration (1999). 
70 Bradley Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought 
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to 
Overzealous Lumping’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 
471. 
perform their own monitoring.71 This has 
been evident into the growing number of 
companies that publish annual reports 
describing their commitment to public 
policy goals. Over 50 per cent of Fortune 50 
companies produce sustainability report and 
nearly 90 per cent Fortune 500 companies 
disclose their stakeholder oriented 
performances.72 A study amongst some 
corporate directors in the USA reveals that 
the rise of ESP provides protections to the 
corporate directors while they operate in a 
‘common sense’ way and take into account 
of the interests of the primary stakeholders. 
When The Economist asked over 1,000 
executives ‘how [their] organisation[s] 
define corporate responsibility’, 31.4 per 
cent of the respondents answered 
‘maximising profits and serving the interests 
of shareholders.’73 This was the second most 
common answer after ‘taking proper account 
of the broader interests of society when 
making business decisions’, which was 
chosen by 38.4 per cent of respondents.74 
This development has methodological 
implications for the conceptual applications 
of CG and social responsibility.  
The study of CG in the USA is 
gradually incorporating the concepts such as 
non-financial accountability, ethical codes 
and standards of conduct, socially driven 
investment and fiduciary duties, board 
diversity, stakeholder engagement, 
sustainability reporting, and socially 
                                                            
71 Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, ‘Management Based 
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve 
Public Goals’ (2003) 37(4) Law & Society Review 691. 
72 For details, see generally Lisa M. Fairfax, ‘The Rhetoric 
of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on 
Corporate Norms’ (2006)31 Journal of Corporate Law 675; 
Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Accountability and Responsibility in 
Corporate Governance’ (2006) 81 Notre Dame Law Review 
1431, 1442–59; See also, Goldman Sachs Global 
Investment Research, Introducing GS Sustain 22 (June 22, 
2007), available at 
www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/summit2007/S1_GOLDMA
N_Ling.pdf  
73 Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Business Barometer 
January 2008 (January 2008) The Economist 
<http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/barometer2.pdf> 13 
June 2011. 
74 Ibid. 
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responsible corporate strategies.75 For an 
instance, the OECD’s recent publication of 
corporate governance principles defines the 
basis of an effective CG framework: it 
‘should promote transparent and efficient 
markets, be consistent with the rule of law 
and clearly articulate the division of 
responsibilities among different supervisory, 
regulatory and enforcement authorities.’76 It 
considers that ESP is instrumental in 
reaching fundamental social and economic 
goals and emphasises that the CG 
framework should be developed with a view 
to its impact on overall economic 
performance, market integrity, and the 
incentives it creates for market participants 
and the promotion of socio-economic 
development. It further mentions that the 
division of responsibilities in CG should be 
‘clearly articulated and ensure that the public 
interest is served.’ 
 
 
V.   Conclusion 
 
The dominant position of shareholder 
primacy has been minimised within the CG 
framework where issues related to 
companies’ public policy and social 
responsibilities are now significant. Changes 
to this dominant position and the rise of 
stakeholder pluralism arguments have 
resulted in the development of the 
enlightened shareholder approach in CG. 
This enlightenment is the source of the 
changes to the traditional notions in CG. 
                                                            
75 Sandra Dawson, ‘Balancing Self Interest and Altruism: 
Corporate Governance Alone is Not Enough’ (2004)12(2) 
Corporate Governance:An International Review 130. For 
some other studies, see Simon Dakin, ‘The Coming 
Transformation of Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13(1) 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 11-18; 
Douglas M Branson, ‘Corporate Governance ‘Reform’ and 
the New Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2001) 62 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 606-647; Jacob M 
rose, ‘Corporate Directors and Social Responsibility: Ethics 
Versus Shareholder Value’ (2007) 73 Journal of Business 
Ethics 319-331; Catherine M Daily, Dan R Dalton and 
Albert a Cannella, ‘Corporate Governance: Decades of 
Dialogue and Data’ (2003) 28 (3) Academy of Management 
Review 371-382. 
76 OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(2004) 17. 
While corporate directors were only 
assigned to look after the return of 
investment, ESP has created the opportunity 
for them to look beyond the set of 
contractual liabilities. It has provided a 
better basis to corporate directors for 
creating internal strategies focusing on 
pluralization of actors, ethics, and 
accountability in corporate self-regulation.  
Section II of this article briefly 
defined CG. Section III surveyed the core of 
the ESP arguments. Rejecting a narrow view 
for shareholder centered neo-classical 
percepts in CG, this section describes how 
the arguments based on justice, fairness and 
communitarianism have helped the 
emergence of ESP. These arguments help 
shareholders to reform their roles in CG and 
therefore the rise of ESP. Of late, ethical 
norms and the need for accountability have 
been two of the driving sources of CG, and 
with stakeholder notion being increasingly 
adopted in existing corporate practices, the 
potential convergence between ESP and 
corporate regulation comes to the 
foreground. This convergence in the face of 
regulatory, business, and social changes has 
somewhat decreased the controversy over 
both the potential and limitations of 
corporate directors’ roles in corporate-
accountability mechanisms.  
The impact of the rise of ESP over 
the development of corporate regulation was 
then briefly canvassed in Section IV. It 
assessed this impact taking the development 
of the USA’s regulations related to corporate 
directors. It finds that the aim of these 
regulations is to advance the interest of 
individual members in a company as well as 
company’s collective interest. These are 
using a mix of different strategies to 
incorporate the precepts of ESP in corporate 
self-regulatory mechanisms. Strategies based 
on legal regulation are not foremost in this 
mix; rather, the USA’s regulation-based 
strategy is meant to assist the internal 
strategies of companies. Of particular 
importance of this strategy is that the 
provisions are allowing corporate directors 
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more flexibility in CG framework, so that 
they can direct internal regulation of 
companies to reach an economically optimal 
level of investment in firm-specific human 
and physical capital.  
